Identification

Title

Cooperation on climate change under economic linkages: How the inclusion of macroeconomic effects affects stability of a global climate coalition

Abstract

Game-theoretic models of international cooperation on climate change come to very different results regarding the stability of the grand coalition of all countries, depending on the stability concept used. In particular, the core-stability concept produces an encouraging result that does not seem to be supported by reality. We extend the game-theoretic model based on this concept by introducing macroeconomic effects of emission reduction measures in multiple countries. The computable general equilibrium model DART and damage functions from the RICE model are used to quantify the theoretical model. Contrary to the classical model, we find that, under damages in the IPCC range, the core of the resulting cooperative game is empty and no stable global agreement exists. This is mainly due to fossil fuel exporting countries, which are negatively affected by lower fossil fuel prices resulting from emission reduction measures.

Resource type

document

Resource locator

Unique resource identifier

code

http://n2t.net/ark:/85065/d7sb4867

codeSpace

Dataset language

eng

Spatial reference system

code identifying the spatial reference system

Classification of spatial data and services

Topic category

geoscientificInformation

Keywords

Keyword set

keyword value

Text

originating controlled vocabulary

title

Resource Type

reference date

date type

publication

effective date

2016-01-01T00:00:00Z

Geographic location

West bounding longitude

East bounding longitude

North bounding latitude

South bounding latitude

Temporal reference

Temporal extent

Begin position

End position

Dataset reference date

date type

publication

effective date

2017-10-01T00:00:00Z

Frequency of update

Quality and validity

Lineage

Conformity

Data format

name of format

version of format

Constraints related to access and use

Constraint set

Use constraints

Limitations on public access

None

Responsible organisations

Responsible party

contact position

OpenSky Support

organisation name

UCAR/NCAR - Library

full postal address

PO Box 3000

Boulder

80307-3000

email address

opensky@ucar.edu

web address

http://opensky.ucar.edu/

name: homepage

responsible party role

pointOfContact

Metadata on metadata

Metadata point of contact